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Articles
A Prospectus for Canadian Legal History
R. C. B. Risk*

Introduction
The study of legal history can be a useful and scholarly
undertaking. An understanding of the uses and limits of law is
useful, if not necessary, for any civilized community, and a
study of legal history is one way, although not the exclusive
way, of achieving this understanding. More generally, our
understanding of history cannot be complete without some
understanding of its legal elements. Therefore, the study of
Canadian legal history should be respectable and flourishing,
but it is not. It has been greatly neglected, and most of the little
work that has been done has reflected limited interests. Lawyers
have usually restricted themselves to the development of
doctrine and the stucture of courts. Historians have considered
a wider range of law, because law has been a large and
unavoidable element of Canadian history, but none has made it
a distinct topic. The result is that we know almost nothing
about our legal past. We have not even accumulated and organized most of the major facts, let alone thought about them.
The neglect and the need are obvious, but the reasons for
the neglect are not. The study of legal history requires
knowledge of legal doctrine, structures and procedures. Lawyers
have had this knowledge, and I have a vested interest in
believing that lawyers can be scholars, but perhaps their interest
and opportunity have been limited by a traditional preoccupation with courts and conflict, and the late entry of lawyers and
legal education into the universities. Perhaps historians have
been interested, but frustrated by lack of knowledge, or perhaps
they have not even been interested. Their interest, also, may
have been restricted by the lack of lawyers in their universities.
During the past couple of years I have perceived an increasing
interest in legal history, although the wish may have been father
to the perception.
*R. C. B. Risk, Professor of Law, University of Toronto. This paper was
presented at the Dalhousie Law School on October 19, 1973.
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What Is Legal History?
Legal history has little inheritance of traditions or speculation
about purposes and methods. Perhaps none are needed, because
enthusiasm and technical knowledge alone might produce useful
and distinctive results, but habit and default can limit effort to
descriptions of conflict, courts and doctrine. Speculation is
needed, not to establish one version of Truth, but to avoid this
limitation, and to explore possibilities for less obvious questions
and themes.
I conceive legal history to be a study of the history of the
legal processes, and this conception can be elaborated in three
overlapping elements: the influences that have shaped law; the
effect of law; and the structure, procedures and functions of
legal institutions.
A vast and complex array of influences have shaped law,
from the fall of man to clerical mistakes, and choice and
assessment of the significant influences must ultimately be an
exercise of judgment. Values have been among the major
influences, and, almost by inversion of the study of
influences, the law can be studied as a record of values.
Considered as a whole and over time, it is a massive and roughly
accurate record. Some of the values are obvious and familiar,
even though interpretations may differ, and some are not,
especially the values expressed in procedures and the common
law. But gaps exist. Not all values have been accurately
expressed, or expressed at all, in law, and values that have been
expressed in law may not have existed in the same intensity in
society. Some values are not appropriate for expression in law,
and expression, modification, or rejection of others may be
stiffled or delayed by competing values or limitations of the
legal processes. Historians sometimes seem to want to make
legal history their hand-maiden, and find evidence about social
values or structure in the legal record. The gaps make this
undertaking either precarious or redundant: only a thorough
knowledge of the society (and a shrewd reading of the legal
record) can enable a judgment to be made about the accuracy
of a small part of the legal record.
The second element is the effect of law on minds and
events. It presents baffling difficulties of analysis and measurement. For example, common law and legislation about
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discrimination and financing techniques have expressed values
about human dignity and economic enterprise, but what has
been their effect on feelings, conduct, and the production and
distribution of goods? Which of the values that law has
expressed have been shaped primarily in some other social
processes, and which have shaped, or have been intended to
shape, values of society? Questions of measurement of this kind
challenge all social scientists.
The third element is the legal institutions: the legislature;
the courts; the executive, government departments and other
administrative agencies; and the legal profession. Their structures, procedures and functions must be described, and the
traditional or expected allocation between lawyers and other
social scientists is largely a reflection of chance and habit. The
first two themes are entangled in this one, and present questions
about legal change, especially the process through which
changing values are expressed or are not expressed in law, and
the effect of a failure or delay to express values that seek
expression.
This conception is a grand challenge. It requires extensive
technical knowledge about doctrine, structures, and procedures,
but it also includes knowledge and topics that are not included
in the traditional work and interests of lawyers, and topics that
other social scientists have studied extensively. Legal history
should not be the monopoly of lawyers and should not be
limited by traditional patterns, but realism demands modesty.
Useful contributions can be made without seeking to meet the
entire challenge. Choice of limits emphasis must be personal
preferences, although I fear that this admission may eventually
be a resort to the enthusiasm and technical knowledge alone
that I hoped to escape.
Themes For CanadianLegal History
Speculation about large themes in Canadian legal history is
needed, like speculation about the nature and limits of legal
history, to avoid thinking only about what is obvious or
determined by traditions and habits. I shall limit my speculation
to Canadian after the mid-nineteenth century, and I suggest
eight themes. They are not proclamations of an exclusive
domain for legal history. They are ways of ordering Canadian
history that seem to me to be useful for legal history. The first
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seven are elaborations of the first two elements and the last is
the legal institutions.
The Nation: Unity and Diversity. What has been the
function of law in the creation and expression of a distinctive
Canadian identity? This theme is a common one in the study of
Canadian history, and appears in different forms for different
times and tastes. Much of the constitutional structure of Canada
is expressed in law, for example, much of confederation,
parliamentary government, geographic expansion, independence
from Great Britain, and international stature. Beyond constitutional structure, the most useful form for this theme is the
tension between unity and diversity, and it has three parts.
The first is the two cultures, which has been a dominant
theme in Canadian history. Our law has usually respected
individual preferences for religious worship, although this
respect has not often been sharply tested. The record about
preferences for education determined by religious differences is
more complex. The conflict about separate schools and
language resulted in compromises that have tended to respect
diversity, but the legal processes performed only a minor
function in achieving these compromises, and often expressed
them in obsure and prosaic ways.
The existence of civil law and common law systems
requires competence in comparative law as well as whatever
other abilities legal history requires. Some of the issues are the
differences between the systems, the effect of the differences
on business transactions, the influences of the systems on each
other, and the extent to which they have been symbols of
differences of identity.
The continuing existence of other religious, national or
ethnic groups is an element of diversity in Canadian life, but the
legal record about this diversity is difficult to assess. They have
been protected by general freedoms of association, worship, and
ownership of property, but have occasionally been singled out
for unpleasant discrimination. Whatever other assessments may
be made, the law has probably not contributed much to the
existence and nature of these groups.
The second part of unity and diversity is regionalism and
metropolitanism; these two concepts are distinct, but overlap
enough to be usefully considered together. Regionalism is
diversity among areas, defined, for example, by geography, the
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characters of peoples, or law. The largest effect of law on
regionalism has been the division of powers between the federal
government and the provinces, even though power to differ or
to impose uniformity must not be assumed to have been
effectively exercised. Whatever might have been the division
intended, the decisions of the courts have tended to favour
provincial power, but the effective process for dividing power
has become executive negotiation. The results of this process
have varied, but have usually tended to give larger powers to the
federal government. Two other legal influences have tended
more clearly towards uniformity. First, each province, apart
from Quebec, has had a tendency to adopt statutes and
common law from other provinces or from another common
source, and second, law has facilitated the exercise of large
private economic powers over great distances, for example
through contact and the corporation.
Metropolitanism is the rise and competition of cities, and
their relation to their hinterland. Cities are entangled in most of
the other themes, but one thread that can be isolated is the use
of law to define and control the hinterland, especially through
the exercise of private economic power.
The third part of unity and diversity is classes and elites.
This is a largely unexplored theme in Canadian history, and
legal history is not likely to be able to make a significant
contribution until more work is done in other social sciences.
Assuming some useful and workable notion of class can be
designed, issues for legal history are, the extent to which law
has defined classes and has been the expression of the
distinctive values of the classes, and the extent to which law has
facilitated or restricted mobility between classes. The powers of
elites take different forms, but the simple distinction between
legal and non-legal power is derived from a limited conception
of law and is too crude to be useful. The question about power
should be the extent and the means through which law has
enabled the accumulation and preservation of power, and the
nature and limits of these means of exercising power compared
to others.
The Influence of England, the United States, and France.
This second theme might have been included in the first, but it
is important enough to be isolated. Much of the form and
content of Canadian law has been influenced by England and
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the United States, and, to a much lesser extent, France. Some
examples of the influences are obvious. For example, the
structures of the legal institutions are largely derived from
England, and reception statutes and the Privy Council formally
imposed much English authority. The issues are the extent of
the influences, why they existed, and whether models were
adapted to Canadian needs. The answers will differ for different
times, topics, areas, and legal institutions.
The Economy. Much of law has been and continues to be
about economic affairs, and this concentration alone demonstrates much about our assumptions about the uses and limits of
law. During the mid-nineteenth century the law gave extensive
powers for private ordering of economic affairs. Three major
aspects of this power were the market, especially the
development of financing, security, and arrangements for
transactions over large distances; business organizations; and the
allocation of losses caused by economic activity. Our economic
affairs are now vastly different. Two general changes are useful
for legal history. The first is government regulation and
participation: what techniques were used and what was the
effect on the inheritance from the nineteenth century? The
second is the growth of power, both public power and private
power. How was law used to accumulate private power, what
attempts have been made to impose control, and what have
been the perceptions and the influence of the distinction
between public and private interests?
Community. During the twentieth century much of the
responsibility for individual economic and physical well-being
has been shifted from the individual, the family, and private
organizations to the government; and many of the risks of living
in a crowded, complex society have been shifted to large
groups. Many legal changes might be included in this theme;
some of the more important ones are workmen's compensation,
unemployment insurance, welfare, compulsory insurance
schemes, medical care plans, and torts decisions that tend
towards imposing losses on interests that can best spread them.
Two more, which demonstrate the effect of technological
change and more complex understandings of cause and effect,
are public health, and food and drug legislation.
The Individual. This theme is the nature and extent of the
opportunities given to individuals to make for themselves
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purposeful lives, and to express and realize their capacities,
hopes and beliefs. It is affected by some of the others, for
example, regulation of economic affairs and the growth of
economic power affect individual choice, and the arrangements
made for economic and physical well-being may affect the
dignity and responsibility of the individual. These apart, one
major topic is the family. It includes changes of roles, powers
and responsibilities of husbands and wives, and merges with
attempts to achieve equality for women. Children present a
shifting tension between efforts to protect and influence, and
efforts to recognize and encourage maturity. Other topics in
which law bears upon the quality of individual life are privacy,
mobility among classes, discrimination, and the freedoms of
association, speech and religion.
The Physical Environment. The physical environment
dominates much of the past and present of Canada. Canadians
have struggled against nature to make a living and a nation, and
have enjoyed immense riches from nature. Even more than
other themes, this is entangled with all the others. Three
specific parts are natural resources, urban planning and control
of use. The natural resources have been immense: animals,
agricultural land, forests, rivers and minerals. During the
nineteenth century, the topics for legal history are the
arrangements for allocation to private use and the accommodation of competing uses. During the twentieth century, the
topics are regulation and participation by government, conservation, and the accommodation of more complex and diffused
policies.
Urban planning probably began in a substantial form
during the early twentieth century. It need not be limited to the
legislation usually referred to as planning legislation or to the
geographic limits of cities; it can include all arrangements made
to plan the patterns and contexts of living, including
arrangements for planning uses of large regions and the design
and location of transportation facilities. Control of use denotes
controls imposed to make the environment a decent place to
live, and perhaps only the recent designation of the environment as a topic for concern justify separating it from other
topics. Some of its components are property rights, particularly
rights to control nuisances; public health legislation; and urban
planning.
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The Control of Violence. One of the basic functions of law
is to control anti-social conduct, especially violence. The
content and use of the criminal law, including procedure, can
suggest much about changing attitudes, and the uses and limits
of law to control conduct. One aspect of this large topic that is
useful and distinctive is the control of violence, particularly
violence on the frontier and violence that was an expression of
economic or political conflict. Legal history is not likely to be
able to contribute much to the measurement of the extent of
the potential and actual violence of this kind, but whatever the
extent may have been, some other issues are the effectiveness of
the legal controls and the purposes and values that determined
assertion of the control. Canada may have experienced more
violence of these kinds than the common belief in a
comfortable and accommodating society might suggest, and the
power of government seems to have been used, often violently
and usually effectively, to control threats to the established
order. If so, what were the extent and effect of a tension
between the reality, and the believed and proclaimed ideals
about the society and the uses of law?
The Legal Institutions. The third of the large elements I
suggest for legal history is the structures, procedures and
functions of the legal institutions. Existing knowledge and
habits make it, or at least parts of it, the most comfortable one
for lawyers.
The Constitution. The choice of the topics to be included
under this title depends greatly upon definitions and purposes.
The monarchy, the parliamentary system and legislative
supremacy all should be included. Much work about them has
already been done, but three appropriate possibilities for legal
history are the use of law to express the values and traditions of
our forms of government, the uneasy accommodation of the
independent administrative agencies and the parliamentary
system, and the influence of legislative supremacy, especially in
the form articulated by Dicey, on the attitudes of courts and
lawyers.
Federalism is the topic about which lawyers have done the
most work that might be catalogued as legal history, and it
certainly has been considered extensively by other social
scientists, but the results make an unfortunate gulf. For
example, the decisions of the courts have been thoroughly
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analyzed, but the effect of these decisions on the exercise of
power and their relation to political developments have not.
Nor have the contrasts between the process of executive
negotiations and the judicial process, and the effect of executive
negotiation on the constitutional functions of the courts.
The Legislatures. The legislatures have been the dominant
legal institution, if a comparison of this sweeping nature can be
sensibly made. Not much work has been done about the
structure, procedures, personnel and functions of the legislatures. All these topics can be included in legal history, but the
contribution of lawyers is likely to be limited to the law-making
function, and especially the relations of this function to the
law-making functions of courts and administrative agencies.
The Courts. Most of the basic outlines of structures,
procedures and personnel were settled by the mid-nineteenth
century, and expressed a large degree of centralization and
professionalization that has only recently been questioned.
Some of the topics in the intervening century are the creation
of the Supreme Court and the abolition of appeals to the Privy
Council; the creation of specialized courts, for example family
courts and the Federal court; the struggle, largely unsuccessful,
to design efficient and fair procedures for large volumes of
litigation; and the selection and lives of judges.
In the mid-nineteenth century the primary function of the
courts was the supervision of private ordering, and elaboration
and administration of the common law. The shift to ordering by
governments and large concentrations of private power has
substantially changed this function. Problems about the effect
of statutes and the limits of government power have become
dominant, and much of the common law has become a source
of generalized attitudes for interpretation of statutes, and for
governing emerging problems until they are settled by some
other process.
The attitudes and values expressed by courts need to be
assessed, but the job is complicated by the institutional needs of
procedures and continuity. The most useful questions about
attitudes in the twentieth century are likely to be about the
limits of government power and about economic conflict,
especially labour conflict; in the nineteenth century, a useful
but more difficult inquiry would be about attitudes towards
economic progress.
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Our courts have tended to express attitudes and values
within narrow limits and through results and technical
reasoning, and they have not usually made decisions that have a
major impact on society. For example, the cases about religious
education in schools and the division of legislative powers
during the depression did not settle the issues at stake. Instead,
they often seem to have allocated the initiative of processing in
some other process. Nor have we used courts much to declare
values or to focus and make apparent problems, especially
diffused problems that affect otherwise relatively powerless
groups, although the litigation about Indian claims is one large
and recent exception.
The AdministrativeAgencies. The vast range of administrative agencies makes the attempt to find general ideas difficult if
not futile. The expansion of administrative agencies in Canada
during the twentieth century was caused by a shift in our
attitudes about the proper functions of government and the
institutional limitations of legislatures and courts. For example,
in the early twentieth century, legislatures and courts could not,
without substantial changes in structures and procedures, have
undertaken control of purity of food, regulation of railroad
rates, or administration of workmen's compensation.
Four topics are useful. The first is the influences on the
form of specific agencies or groups of agencies, for example, the
influence of the United States in the development of the
economic regulatory agencies; the second is the effect of
massive government activity on the individual, particularly the
right to participate in making decisions and the creation and
protection of the new kinds of stakes in the community; the
third is the procedures for making decisions; and the fourth is
the techniques and effectiveness of the control of the agencies.
All these topics, and particularly the last two, include the
relation between the agencies and courts and legislatures.
The Legal Profession. The legal profession must be
included among the legal institutions because of its role in the
creation and administration of law, and it is composed of five
topics. The first is functions; it includes the kinds of jobs
lawyers have done, their knowledge, skills and products, their
clients, and their effect, especially their effect on the structure
and conduct of business and on the relations between
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government and the individual. The second is organization; it
includes the distribution of lawyers, both geographically, and
among government, business, and private practice; the distribution of jobs and clients; and the organization of lawyers into
firms. These first two topics also include the existence of
competition from non-lawyers and prohibitions against this
competition. The third topic is the government of the
profession. What have been the attitudes of lawyers and the
public towards self-government? What have been the structure,
powers, policies and effects of the governing bodies; what have
been the means and extent of public accountability; and what
has been the actual degree of independence of lawyers in
relation to government and large corporate clients? The fourth
topic is attitudes and responsibilities about law, the practice of
law, and public affairs. What have been the attitudes of lawyers,
and the public, towards values expressed in law and change in
law; what have been the perceived responsibilities of lawyers
towards clients and the public; and what have been the
consequences of any gap between attitudes and perceptions,
and reality. The fifth topic is legal education and qualification
to practice, which is one of the few topics of legal history that
has been written about already, even though much remains to
be done.
All these themes have been influenced by massive changes
that have not been limited to Canada, including technological
changes, industrialization, urbanization, interdependence, and
changing attitudes towards the individual and government. How
much of the legal history of Canada is distinctive, particularly in
contrast to England and the United States? Of course, a
multitude of particular differences can be collected. Three
topics that include larger and more useful differences are unity
and diversity, the use of government to accomplish economic
objectives, and federalism. Beyond these, I suggest two much
more general ways in which Canada has been distinctive. First,
we have tended to make less use of law to establish or preserve
important values. Of course, our legal records are an immense
expression of values, but some are not included that might have
been, and, more important, some that are included were not
debated and formed through the legal processes or are expressed
in obscure or prosaic forms. Second, we have had considerable
faith in government, and have granted, or endured without

238 The Dalhousie Law Journal

much protest, substantial powers to regulate our collective and
individual affairs.
The Law and the Economy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
As an example of work that can be done, I offer some
preliminary thoughts about law and economic change in the
mid-nineteenth century in Ontario. I have chosen the period
from 1841 to 1867, from the union of Upper and Lower
Canada to confederation, because dates are needed to limit
research, and this is a familiar constitutional period that
includes legal developments that are unified and important. I
have limited my work to Canada West - Ontario - even though
it was only a part of a unitary state, because of the differences
between the common law and the civil law.
Much happened during this period that shaped the structure
and issues of our law and government more than a century
afterwards. Responsible government, the difficulties of accommodating the differences between the two cultures, and the
emergence of confederation dominated the politics of the times
and the writing afterwards. Less dramatic but crucial changes
were made in municipal government, and court structure.
In 1841, the economy was dominated by the production
of timber and grain, and the transportation system of the St.
Lawrence. The timber and grain were produced primarily for
export to England, and this market seemed to depend upon the
preferential tariffs of the mercantile system. These preferences
disappeared during the 1840's, but after a brief slump in the
late 1840's, production increased and markets in the United
States expanded. Transportation improvements seemed needed
to market the Canadian products and to capture the trade of
the mid-West. During the 1840's, canals for the St. Lawrence
seemed crucial. During the 1850's, technology changed and
railroads captured imaginations and pocketbooks. The general
transportation objectives remained the same, but were only
partly achieved. Canadian products were served, but capture of
the trade of the mid-West remained a vision. Financing and
control of economic activity was ultimately controlled in
distant metropolitan centres, especially London and New York.
This control was established primarily through private arrangements, and throughout the period these arrangements became
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more complex and tended to allocate larger shares of power in
Ontario.
An account of the legal development can be divided into
four topics: the market, business organizations, the allocation
of the natural resources, and transportation. First, the market.
The law gave extensive powers for private ordering. The symbol
and the most important expression of these powers was the law
of contract. This was its golden age. Its major outlines had been
settled by the English courts by the early nineteenth century
and have remained settled in substantially the same form.
Uncertainties, elaboration and change were small, and most
were confined to three topics, consideration, conditions and
damages. The essence of contract and the reason for the lack of
major changes was its abstractness and generality. It established
distant limits and few requirements, and permitted businessmen
to make whatever agreements seemed useful. General rules that
did not take the peculiar merits of each transaction into
account enabled businessmen to plan and rely.
Credit and capital were usually badly needed and scarce.
The sources were relatives, friends, merchants, and the financial
institutions, especially banks. The usury legislation was substantially repealed during the 1850's, but it was continually
debated. The need for capital opposed the immorality of usury,
and both were caught up in political struggles more than other
legal issues. The major form of credit was negotiable instruments - bills of exchange and promissory notes. Like contracts,
the major outlines of the law had been settled by English
courts, although the increasing complexity of commercial
transactions, difficulty of communications, and transactions
with the civil law community seemed to require more
adjustment. Again, like contracts, the essence was abstractness
and generality, which enabled businessmen to plan and rely.
Lenders wanted security. The simplest and probably most
common form was a personal guarantee by a relative or friend
of the debtor, given by contract or by becoming an accommodation party to a negotiable instrument. Upon default, guarantors
sought technical defences, which were assessed in a multitude of
cases. Mortgages were given of land, and bond mortgages were
occasionally used in railroad financings. The most interesting
security developments were the use of goods that were being
purchased or produced as security, especially grain and timber.
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During the 1850's legislation established a registry system and
priorities for chattel mortgages, and enabled bills of landing and
warehouse receipts to be used as security.
The significant forms of business organization were the
partnership and the corporation; deeds of settlement and other
complex trust arrangements were uncommon and unimportant.
Partnerships were commonly used for all business purposes
except financial institutions and the construction and operation
of public utilities (canals, harbours, bridges, roads, railroads,
telegraphs, and gas, light and water services). An accurate count
of numbers cannot be made, but doubtless thousands were
formed. The law was entirely common law, and it too was well
settled. Most of the cases were about internal conflicts and
accounting problems after dissolution. Large issues of function
or power were never debated in either the courts or the
legislative. A limited partnership act was enacted in 1849, but
rarely used.
The corporation was used primarily for financial institutions and public utilities, occasionally for manufacturing, and
only rarely for other business purposes. About 650 were
created, although many of these never became established
businesses. At first, individual statutes were enacted for each
one. Later, general incorporation statutes permitted creation by
registration of documents or by executive act. Most of the work
of the courts was within a limited range that included problems
about seals, calls on shares, and capacity. In the legislature,
corporations were opposed and feared because of their power,
although this attitude was confused by an assumption that
corporations would naturally tend to become monopolies, and
by a failure to distinguish the creation of a corporation from
grants of powers that could be given, but need not be. (This
attitude may, in retrospect, seem to have been right for the
wrong reasons.) During the early part of the period, these
attitudes limited the use of corporations to functions that had
substantial public utility and that did not threaten to compete
with individual businessmen. Limited liability was often
debated, and the need for capital was opposed by the morality
of individual responsibility, but it was always given. During the
late 1850's and early 1860's the public utility characteristic and
justification faded and the corporation became available for a
wider range of private business purposes. The major outlines for
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creation and internal ordering had been established, even
though wide-spread use came decades later.
The land was a vast natural resource for settlement,
agriculture, timber and minerals. By 1841, much of the land in
the south had been granted. Crucial debates and problems had
begun and continued until the land fit for settlement was
substantially exhausted during the 1860's. The fundamental
issues were the kind of a society the land should be used to
make, and economic development, social structure, religion and
education were all affected. The debate about the terms for
grants was about free grants, cash sale, instalment payments and
settlement duties, and major administrative problems were
squatters, speculation, and the location of boundaries.
Once land was granted, each owner had extensive power to
determine its use. The grants were made in fee simple absolute
(subject to some reservations of timber and minerals), and the
common law and legislation imposed only a few, distant
restrictions. The common law gave owners power to impose
restrictions and to divide ownership in ways that divided and
impaired powers to determine use, but these powers were not
often exercised. The power to transfer was equally extensive,
and was supplemented by decisions of courts enforcing
agreements for sale, and legislation that established a registry
system to enable transactions to be made reliable. The right to
take timber was usually given by licence to cut, and not a fee
simple grant of the land, although much was cut by trespassers,
settlers, and pretended settlers. The debates about policy were
about revenue for the crown, monopoly, and development. The
administrative problems were boundaries, collection of revenue,
and accommodation between lumbermen and settlers.
The terms for allocation of the resources were established
by statute and regulation, and extensive powers were delegated
to the executive to set the terms for both land and timber. The
work of the courts was largely interpretation and elaboration.
The most important cases involved conflicting transfers by
settlers made before and after grant of letters patent, and the
nature of the interest of the owner of a licence to cut timber.
The rivers and streams were another important natural
resource for water power and transportation of timber. The
legal problems were products of conflicting uses: a mill might
flood a farm, or impair the power for another mill, and might
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impede a timber drive (or, more likely, be damaged or
destroyed). The most important cases decided by the courts
were about riparian rights (the doctrine of riparian rights was
adopted only after an early flirtation with the doctrine of prior
acquisition) and navigability, and legislation supplemented the
common law about navigability. The results seem to have
expressed two policies that were not cntirely compatible: to
encourage productive activity and to accommodate the conflicting uses.
The struggle to improve transportation facilities was
dominated by the railroad boom of the 1850's. The government
constructed and operated some of the facilities, primarily
timber slides, roads and canals. The remainder, the majority,
were undertaken by corporations that were essentially public
utilities. The enabling statutes specified the approximate
locations or routes, and gave large powers of expropriation.
Usually no guarantee was given that competing services would
not be created, but some reasonable expectation of protection
seems to have been implicit. The statutes usually imposed
simple controls over tolls, and standards for construction and
operation, but lack of will, and administrative resources and
expertise greatly restricted their effect.
The ships and trains presented problems of obligations to
the users, and accidents. Obligations to users involved obligations to make services available and, more often and more
interesting, liability for delay, loss, or damage to goods. During
the 1850's the courts considered problems of the nature and
termination of the liability of common carriers. During the
1860's, sweeping standard form exculpatory clauses appeared
and were enforced, sadly but firmly, through a combination of
freedom of contract and English authority. Accidents were
problems of liability and negligence. Much of the law about
liability for negligence was made during the nineteenth century,
and much of it was made in cases about railroad accidents.
Plenty of accidents occurred in Ontario, although most were
governed by legislation that specified obligations to fence and
imposed liability for failure to comply. In these, cases, through
interpretation, and in cases involving fires and accidents to
railroad employees, the courts tended to limit the liability of
the railroads.
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What were the influences that shaped this law? The first
two are technology, especially the coming of the railroad, and
the physical environment, especially distance and the natural
resources. They imposed limits to what was conceivable or
apparently possible, and shaped beliefs about what was useful
or desirable. These influences were fundamental and pervasive,
but did not alone determine the shape and content of the law.
The next five influences are beliefs, or values.
The first was a belief in the need and feasibility of
economic development, and a belief that law could help achieve
it. The second was a belief that development could best be
achieved through private initiative, which was expressed, for
example, in the extent of the power of private ordering through
contract and the power to determine the uses of the land. The
third was a corollary or consequence of the second: a belief that
each individual should bear the responsibility for his affairs
which, was expressed, for example in decisions about parol
evidence, disclosure, and negligence. The fourth belief, which
was more ambiguous and uneven, was about the extent to
which private power should be dispersed; for example, beliefs in
a fairly wide dispersal were expressed in debates about
corporations, and about land and timber policy. The fifth was a
belief that the state should encourage private initiative. Some
expressions of this belief are familiar, for example, the efforts
to make favourable trading arrangements with England and the
United States, the construction and operation of transportation
facilities, and the grants of power and funds to the railroads.
Another manifestation, which is less familiar but important, is
arrangements to facilitate the operation of the market, for
example, legislation setting standards for products and decisions
about enforcement of contracts.
But an examination of beliefs or values as influences
tempts us to exaggerate the effect on law of reason and
deliberate effort. This study, and probably any other study of
legal history, demonstrates that inertia, habit and ignorance
have far greater effect. Beliefs, especially beliefs about the
market, were inherited unexpressed and unexamined. Decisions,
especially decisions about natural resources, were made and not
made without awareness of consequences and alternatives.
Responses were made to immediate and sharply-focused needs,
and more diffused needs were not perceived. The last influence

244 The Dalhousie Law Journal

on the law is the subtle effects of the legal processes themselves.
Two are suggestive. The first is the effect of precedent, and the
second is the inadequate or distorted perception of issues,
caused, for example, by the rules of pleading and lack of
legislative resources.
The courts decided thousands of cases about economic
activity. The courts conceived their function to be primarily to
settle individual disputes according to legislation or the settled
authority of the common law, and secondarily to establish
arrangements that would enable businessmen to order their
affairs. The scope and obligation to change the common law
seemed small, and was usually limited to consideration of
particular contexts in the application of general principles, and
the use and authority of precedent, especially English precedent, was extensive and strong. The process of common law
reasoning was usually an attempt to pursue the logical
implications of authority, regardless of the merits of individual
disputes, and it was made even more formal and abstract by the
forms of action and the rules of pleading. This process often
impaired the function of enabling private ordering. The needs
and problems of business were not often expressly and
extensively considered, but it is in some of these discussions
that I find the only potential judicial hero: William Hume
Blake, the Chancellor from 1849 to 1862.
The legislature, not the courts, made the major changes in
legal policy. The most distinctive feature of the statutes is that
they tended to be responses to specific and imminent problems
or wants, and were often distorted and limited in their
immediate causes. The process that produced them shared this
tendancy; the debates were often sharp, but erratic and
repetitive, and attempts to gather facts and make comprehensive long-term plans and assessments of consequences and
alternatives were rare. The legislature did much copying from
England and New York, but more from convenience than felt
obligation. The United States had a large influence on the
statutes and virtually none on the common law. Both courts
and legislature probably expressed public attitudes fairly
accurately, and both tended to reflect the attitudes, rather than
attempt to make them.
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Conclusion
Much was accomplished during the mid-nineteenth century,
especially during the decade from 1848 to 1858. But what can
be the use of this study or any other study of legal history,
apart from the pleasures of doing it? Legal history can not give
us any specific lessons about how to manage our affairs. It can
give understanding and perspective, especially about the
functions and limits of the legal processes.
It pleases our vanity to believe that our times are troubled
and important, but even taking this tendency into account,
profound changes seem to be occurring. We struggle to establish
our beliefs, to comprehend baffling inertia and complexity, and
to control our affairs. The challenge of how to govern ourselves
seem to be dominant. Much of the struggle is about our legal
inheritance, especially the distinction between public and
private, the legitmacy of law derived from secular authority and
utility, and the form of law based on print, hierarchical
delegation, and professionalization. The future will see fundamental changes, but prediction needs a prophet, not a lawyer.

